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INTRODUCTION  
Poverty reduction is the overriding objective of economic development, widely recognized 
nationally and internationally. The World Bank defines its mission in terms of ending 
extreme poverty (along with shared prosperity), as does the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and other international development agencies.   Recent international development 
compacts sponsored by the United nations—such as the Millennium Development Goals 
and the Sustainable Development Goals—assign poverty reduction the pride of place in 
their list of development goals, along with  other correlates of poverty,  such as  infant and 
maternal mortality, illiteracy, lack of access to sanitation, water, and electricity.  Those goals, 
which have been signed by the membership of the United Nations, are now part of their 
development plans and programs.    
The term poverty has been defined in various ways. The following provides a quick 
review of the various concepts used in development discourse. In general, a person is 
considered poor if his/her income or consumption falls short being adequate. Adequacy is 
defined in relation to the poverty line, a critical level of income or consumption, below 
which one is considered poor by society.  The poverty line as a critical threshold of income 
(or consumption) depends on the norms of a particular society. The poverty-line income (or 
consumption) usually includes both food and non-food items, the basic building block 
being the food component.  
The poverty line is defined in either absolute or relative terms. When poverty is defined 
in relation to an absolute poverty line, it is called absolute poverty; in contrast, when 
poverty is defined in relation to a relative poverty line, it is called relative poverty. The latter 
can be defined in relation to the income (or consumption) distribution parameters of the 
society, such as the mean, the median, mode, or various moments of distribution etc. The 
definition of relative poverty, as widely used in Western Europe, sets the poverty line at a 
constant proportion of the current mean (or median) income. 
Depending on national poverty standards, poverty lines vary across countries. For 
example, although India and Bangladesh are neighboring countries, they have different 
poverty lines, the Bangladesh line being higher than that of India. Similarly, Indonesia and 
Philippines have different poverty lines, with the Philippines being higher than Indonesia.  
 In its 1990 World Development Report, the World Bank devised an international poverty 
line to measure global poverty, a common international threshold that is applied across all 
countries. At the time, the World Bank set the international poverty line at roughly $1 a day 
per person in terms of the purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars. The World Bank updates 
the international poverty line periodically to reflect changes in the cost of living for basic 
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food, clothing, and shelter around the world. After a new round and larger volume of 
internationally comparable prices were collected in 2005, the international poverty line was 
set at $1.25 per person per day (in PPP terms). In 2015, the threshold was further updated 
to the current $1.90 per person per day.1 
The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the state of 
poverty across the world—how the incidence of poverty in various regions and countries in 
the world has progressed. Section 3 reviews the effectiveness of various policies. The final 
section provides some concluding remarks.   
THE STATE OF GLOBAL POVERTY  
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, global poverty was on the decline.  In 1990, more than a 
third of people in the world—about 2 billion--lived in extreme poverty, subsisting on $1.90 
a day or less. In 2015, the most recent year with robust data, extreme poverty reached 10 
percent, about 736 million, which was the lowest level in recorded history. In the past three 
decades, more than one billion people moved out of extreme poverty, and almost half the 
countries reduced extreme poverty to less than 3 percent (See, Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Poverty at the International Poverty Line of $1.90/day (in 2011 PPP) 
Region Headcount ratio (%)   No. poor (millions) 
  1990 2015 1990 2015 
East Asia and Pacific 61.6 2.3 987.1 47.2 
Europe and Central Asia 2.9 1.5 13.3 7.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 14.2 4.1 62.6 25.9 
Middle East and North Africa 6.2 5.0 14.2 18.6 
South Asia 47.3 12.4 535.9 216.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 54.9 41.1 277.5 413.3 
World Total 35.9 10.0 1894.8 735.9 
   Source: (World Bank, 2018) 
 
 
However, not all regions of the world experienced a similar reduction in poverty 
reduction. In 1990, more than 60 percent of the population of East Asia and the Pacific was 
under the poverty line. With accelerating growth, those countries achieved a dramatic 
reduction in poverty by 2015, when less than 3 percent of the population was under 
classified as poor. South Asia also experienced a significant reduction in poverty. In 1990, 
almost 50 percent of its population experienced   poverty, which declined to little more than 
12 percent in 2015. The two countries in the world that moved most people out of poverty 
were China and India, the former accounting for more than 730 million while latter by more 
than 1 70 million. 
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The rate of poverty reduction was much slower in Sub-Saharan Africa, where it declined 
from about 54 percent in 1991 to 41 percent in 2015—a much more sluggish rate, largely 
reflecting the slower rate of economic growth in the region. In contrast with other regions, 
the absolute size of the population suffering from poverty increased from about 277 million 
in 1990 to 413 million in 2015.  
In 2015, Sub-Saharan Africa, which was home to 27 of the world’s 28 poorest countries, 
had more extremely poor people than in the rest of the world combined. Nigeria was 
expected to surpass India as the country with the most people living in extreme poverty. 
While the average poverty rate for other regions was below 13% as of 2015, it stood at 
about 41% in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the World Bank (2018), factors behind the 
higher incidence of poverty in Africa include slower growth, ethnic conflicts, weak 
institutions and finally, a lack of success in translating growth into poverty reduction. 
How is then global poverty shaping up? What is now clear is that the COVID-19 
pandemic—in conjunction with the precipitous fall in oil prices—has had a 
disproportionately unfavorable impact on the poor of many developing countries — and 
the adverse impact is still unfolding. They suffered from job losses, fall in remittances, rising 
consumer prices, and disruptions of services relating to education and health care. The 
World Bank estimates that national lockdowns and the global economic collapse could 
push 40-60 million into extreme poverty, eliminating nearly all the gains made since 2015 
(World Bank, 2020). The global extreme poverty rate could rise by 0.3 to 0.7 percentage 
points to around 9 per cent in 2020. The forecasts from the United Nations are even more 
dire, suggesting that the pandemic could push as many as 580 million people around the 
world into poverty, adding to the 730 million people who were already in poverty. (Sumner 
et al., 2020). 
 
ADDRESSING POVERTY 
To fix ideas, assume that the income of a person depends on ownership of  assets ( or 
access to such assets), the returns (or productivity) of those assets, and the volatility of 
those returns (World Bank, 2000/2001). Those assets can be of several types, such as human 
capital, land ownership, financial assets (such as savings and access to credit), and social 
assets such as social capital (networks of contacts and reciprocal obligations that can be 
drawn upon in times of need) ( see, (Quibria, 2003).  The returns to those assets depend, 
among others, on public policy and the strategy of development pursued by a country.  
Finally, the volatility of returns results stems from market fluctuations, weather conditions 
and natural disasters, political turbulence, health epidemic, etc. 
The above discussion on causation suggests that there are two principal ways to address 
poverty. One is to increase the returns to assets of the poor—particularly, labor-- by 
enabling growth that creates improved economic opportunities for the poor.  Such a pattern 
of growth, called inclusive growth,2 can be fostered   by enhancing the efficiency of the 
domestic markets as well as exploiting opportunities available in the global economy. The 
other route to poverty reduction is by distribution, i.e., distributing assets (or improving 
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access to assets) to the poor so that they can participate more actively in the productive 
process. For the vast majority of the poor, who are mostly bereft of   capital—physical or 
financial—or land, the most important asset is labor power. However, the success 
distributive policies vary between societies as well as at different periods of histories.   
Poverty Reduction through Inclusive Growth 
As the history of post-War economic development suggests, the most effective antidote to 
poverty is sustained economic growth.3 Economic growth results fundamentally from 
accumulation of resources— both physical and human capital—and technical progress ( 
which emerges   from improved  management of work and adoption of new or 
nontraditional technologies).4 Those factors create employment opportunities and raise 
worker productivity and, consequently, workers’ earnings (Pernia & Quibria, 1999). 
Moreover, economic growth augments the pool of available public and private resources 
that can be used to improve institutions and social services, such as education and health 
care, which are all critically important for the functioning of economic systems and 
increasing worker productivity. 
The relationship between growth and poverty is mediated through income inequality. 
The extent of poverty in a country is determined by economic growth, which enhances 
average income within a society, and the distribution of that income among  members of 
society (Quibria, 2002). The extent to which economic growth translates into poverty 
reduction depends upon what happens to economic inequality.5 If there is no change in 
economic inequality, increments in income accruing to different segments of the population 
happen in exactly the same proportion as the initial income distribution. Thus, if initial 
distribution is skewed, with a much larger proportion of income accruing to the rich, the 
resultant distribution follows the exact same pattern.  However, if economic growth is 
associated with a reduction in economic inequality, it would translate into a more than 
proportionate reduction in poverty. Moreover, if reduced inequality stimulates growth, that 
could lead to further future reductions in poverty. However, if higher rates of economic 
growth are associated with an increase in economic inequality, which is often the case, the 
rate of poverty reduction would be less than proportionate.  
There is a considerable body of empirical literature that explored the relationship 
between growth and poverty (see Quibria 2002 for a review of the literature). The literature 
follows two strands, the first uses a concept of absolute poverty. Some of those studies 
utilized a global dataset, while others were limited to Latin American countries. The results 
were different. The studies that were limited to Latin American countries found poverty 
elasticity around unity (i.e., one percentage change in growth was accompanied by one 
percentage change in poverty), while the others found the value of poverty elasticity 
exceeded unity. The second strand of the literature relies on a relative concept of poverty, 
defining   the poor as those who were in the first quintile of the income distribution. Those 
studies used the same dataset and arrived at similar empirical results that suggested the 
poor gain proportionately from overall income growth. Alternatively, it suggests that 
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income distribution, as far as the lowest quantile is concerned, remains   invariant with 
economic growth. It may be noted that those results do not represent a universal 
generalization. In short, the principal lever of poverty reduction globally seems to have been 
growth.  
Outward-orientation and Growth 
According to a high-profile World Bank study (Commission on Growth and Development, 
2008), only 13 countries achieved a growth rate of 7 percent and over, sustained over 25 
years, in the latter half of the last  century. The study further suggested that this astounding 
economic feat was possible only because the world economy was more open and 
integrated than ever. The outward orientation of the East Asian miracle economies has also 
been corroborated by a number of  comparative studies of those economies (see, for 
example, Quibria, 2002).Subsequent to the East Asian miracle, China, India and Vietnam 
have mimicked   a similar strategy of outward orientation with varying degrees of success.  
How does an outward-oriented strategy help growth and poverty reduction? First, note 
that the growth of an autarchic economy is limited by the elasticities of demand for its 
products. But when a country can successfully access the global economy, it has a deep and 
elastic market for its exports.  While division of labor within a country is limited by the 
extent of the market, integration with the global economy affords specialization in new 
exports and improvements in productivity. Second, as trade theory suggests, developing 
countries, with surplus labor, have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive production.  
Specialization and exports of labor-intensive products lead to increased employment and 
rise in wages; this in turn contributes to a reduction in poverty. In short, outward orientation 
helps a country to overcome the limitations of domestic markets and exploit new economic 
opportunities in international markets. Moreover, trade openness creates competitive 
pressures for the domestic economy, thereby eliminating various domestic distortions and 
inefficiencies. Finally, trade openness facilitates access to new technology and helps 
upgrade the industrial structure.  The East Asian experience suggests that export orientation 
was a critical factor in accelerating the process of skill formation. Export orientation 
increased the pressure for learning for two reasons:    the need to move toward modern 
sophisticated technology to remain competitive, and the ability to respond to the 
requirements of complex contracts from Western countries. 
Another aspect of openness relates to foreign investment, particularly foreign 
technology. Foreign direct investment (FDI) brings new production techniques, quality 
control, and access to external markets. This is corroborated by the experiences of high-
performing East-Asian miracle economies, in which the production network of FDI played a 
positive role in expanding exports. In addition, FDI created competitive pressure on local 
firms to acquire new skills; it  also created a number of spillover effects in the labor market, 
such as the emergence of specialized firms to provide such services as accounting, from 
which both domestic and foreign companies could  benefited. However, the most important 
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spillover effect was the demonstration effect on domestic firms regarding feasibility in terms 
of production and quality (Quibria, 2002).6 
Inward Orientation and Agriculture 
Not all countries can successfully pursue an outward-oriented manufacturing-led growth 
strategy.7 Some economies have pursued a more inward-oriented strategy, which relies 
predominantly on domestic demand, particularly agriculture, as its impetus of growth. 
However, a combination of inadequate domestic demand and inadequate availability of 
foreign exchange can limit the success of an inward-oriented strategy. 
As the majority of the poor people in developing countries are based in the rural 
economy, it is generally assumed that growth in agriculture is likely to result in a significant 
reduction in poverty. However, the impact of agricultural growth has varied across regions 
of the world. While growth in agriculture was most effective for poverty reduction in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, it was less effective in East Asia, where,  with its outward 
orientation, industry was the most effective vehicle  for poverty reduction (Hasan & Quibria, 
2004).   
Domestic-demand led strategies, when accompanied by adequate public investment in 
physical and social infrastructure, can spur business investment and increase the size and 
efficiency of domestic producers (Hasan & Quibria, 2004). This strategy can also avoid the 
risks and dislocations associated with abrupt opening up of economies to fierce foreign 
competition. Nevertheless, growth strategies that rely entirely on domestic demand 
eventually hit the wall of diminishing returns as the home market is usually too small to 
sustain high rates of growth for long  and does not give an  economy the same degree of 
freedom to specialize in accordance with its comparative advantage. 
Domestic Liberalization 
Growth entails a structural transformation of the economy—from agriculture to 
manufacturing, from rural to urban. This transformation is the result of competitive pressure. 
Governments committed to growth must therefore liberalize product markets, allowing new, 
more productive firms to enter and obsolete firms to exit. 
They must also create space to maneuver in the labor market so that new industries can 
quickly create jobs and workers can move freely to fill them. The history of development 
suggests that these reforms are easier advocated than enacted (as the recent Indian 
experience corroborates). If comprehensive reform of labor laws is politically impossible, 
policy makers should seek pragmatic compromise that fulfills the aspirations of jobseekers 
and is not blocked by politically influential jobholders. 
As a dynamic economy goes through a process of “creative destruction”, it is of course 
cold comfort to those who are displaced in the process. Policy makers should resist 
protectionist impulses to shield particular industries or jobs; they should endeavor to defend 
people, by offering displaced workers education and training, assistance that makes it easy 
for them to find new employment. In addition, governments should establish social safety 
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nets to ensure an uninterrupted access to basic services to people that are between job. 
These policies are both ethically grounded and economically sound. Without such safety net 
policies, popular support for a growth strategy will quickly erode— and the impetus for 
employment creation and poverty reduction will cease. 
Public Investments in Physical infrastructure  
Regardless of a country’s development strategy, there is an important role for public 
investments in physical infrastructure—such as ports, roads, highways, electricity and 
telecommunications.  Without adequate investments in physical infrastructure such as the 
factory-to-port transport networks, efficient ports and an uninterrupted supply of electricity, 
it is difficult to pursue a successful strategy of outward-oriented growth. Sufficient 
investments are required even to pursue a successful domestic demand-based strategy. 
One important example of such a strategy is agriculture-led development, which entails 
traversable roads connecting farmgate to markets, electricity for irrigation and rural non-
farm enterprises, and the existence of a telecommunication network providing market 
information to the farmers and rural enterprises. These public investments infrastructure do 
not necessarily crowd-out private investments; rather, they often attract, or crowd-in, new 
private investments. Investments in public infrastructure raise the returns to existing 
businesses and spur the growth of new enterprises, thereby creating employment and 
contributing to poverty reduction.  
 
Distributive Policies to Empower the Poor  
In many instances, growth is clearly not sufficient to reduce poverty. It requires some 
distributive policies that involve redistribution of income, assets, or improving access to 
services. However, managing the politics of redistribution much easier if in a growing 
economy. When an economy grows, the proceeds of growth can be redistributed without 
anyone’s standard of living being adversely affected.  
 
Public Investment in Human Capital 
Investments in human capital relate to investments in education, health and nutrition, those 
investments that increase human productivity and help to improve the economic 
opportunities for the poor. 
The existing literature suggests that investments in education have a positive effect on 
individual earnings. Studies also indicate that those with have a higher level of education 
earn more than those with less education, even though social returns to education are 
highest for primary education. A high-profile World Bank Study (World Bank, 1993) went so 
far as to argue that primary education was the most important single factor of growth of 
East Asian miracle economies. 
Education has effects other than private earnings. It changes workers’ attitudes and 
perspectives; those with education are more favorably disposed to innovation and 
adaptable to new ways of doing things. In poorer countries more educated farmers are 
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found to be more innovative and enterprising as they adopt new seed and fertilizer more 
quickly than those that are not educated.  Other positive effects of education include many 
beneficial externalities, such as better educated mothers being more likely to have fewer 
and healthier children and more efficient in home-production. 
Similarly, health and nutrition have a positive impact on the productive efficiency of the 
poor. Some studies suggest that the causation runs from education to nutrition, health and 
family planning, and then to productivity, as education improves understanding of the need 
for hygiene, proper nutrition and health care. At the same time, better nutrition and health 
also enhances the capacity to learn. Because of the interactive links among education, 
nutrition, health and family planning, the net effects on productivity and poverty reduction 
are difficult to isolate empirically What is important is to understand that there is a virtuous 
cycle from investments in these areas. Similarly, the lack of investment can lead to a vicious 
cycle that can stem from hunger, malnutrition and poverty. For example, if children are 
undernourished in the womb or in infancy, their cognitive development can be permanently 
impaired, leading to a cycle of inter-generational poverty.   
Given the critical importance of human capital investment for poverty reduction, access 
of the poor to those services needs to be improved. This can be achieved through better 
public investment and pricing policies.  Public investment policy can be improved by setting 
priorities better both within and across sectors, directing subsidized public investments into 
those sectors and subsectors with the highest returns and are primarily utilized by the poor, 
such as basic education, primary health care and family planning. Education resources need 
to be mobilized in a non-distortionary manner, management and internal efficiency 
improved and targeting to the poor sharpened. 
Pricing policy that differentiates prices by type of service and type of consumer is 
considered to be generally more efficient and equitable than low and uniform price policies. 
Prices should be raised for higher-level services, such as tertiary education and specialized 
curative health care, which are primarily consumed by the nonpoor. The savings should be 
directed toward more or better basic services, such as primary education and healthcare, 
which benefit the poor. 
 
Land Reform   
Land reform—either in the form of redistribution of land from landlord to the landless 
farmers or tenurial reform in favor of the tenants—is intended to decrease poverty and 
increase output. As the history of land reform suggests, tenancy reform that often 
contravenes market forces  has in most cases been largely unsuccessful, while redistributive 
land reform  programs, which were often based on land expropriation with little or no 
compensation, are successful when they are accompanied by an assistance program of credit 
and  extension services (Rashid & Quibria, 1995). The examples cited of such successful 
reforms include Japan, Korea and Taiwan, where they had a salutary effect on growth and 
equity. However, land reform that is based on marker-based compensation has limited 
redistributive value. 
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Land reform is essentially a political process. Its success hinges on the government’s ability 
to manage the politics associated with it . A recent example of failed land reform is 
Zimbabwe, where the government encouraged the landless workers to seize large farms 
owned by white farmers.  With uncertainty hanging over the issue of the security of property 
rights as well as the lack of adequate resources of the new owners, this land reform 
experiment resulted in the precipitous decline in the farm output, collapse of the economy 
and a large increase in poverty.    
Microcredit 
The poor people usually have little or no access to financial services—such as credit or 
insurance—which limits their escape route from poverty. The introduction of microcredit to 
the poor by Professor Mohammad Yunus in Bangladesh in the 1970s was intended to 
address the poverty of the poorest of the poor.   Microcredit programs are now available in 
many countries across the world.  
There are wildly divergent views about the effectiveness of microcredit in alleviating 
poverty. There are those who argue that microcredit had a significant role in pulling people 
out of poverty while there are others who argue   that microcredit has had   little or no 
positive effect. Both views seem to find some corroboration in case studies. There are many 
cases of success with credit, where borrowers took out additional loans and continued to do 
so year after year, built flourishing small businesses, educated children and improved 
nutrition.  There are other cases that suggest that microcredit did help little in increasing 
households’ income   and, in some cases, even led to a debt trap. 
Econometric studies in this regard are equally ambiguous. Some studies have found a 
positive impact of microcredit on poverty. This literature—which is marked by sniping and 
counter-sniping by authors regarding the soundness of methodology or adequacy of 
data—has turned the matter into an obtuse insider debate and yielded little clarity (Quibria, 
2012).  
In recent years, randomized control trials (RCTs) have become de riguer of empirical 
economic research. They have also been applied to study microcredit as a tool of poverty 
alleviation. A set of RCT studies, which  were  summarized in a recent article   (Banerjee, et 
al., 2015),  found   little evidence of  “transformative”  effects of microcredit on poverty. 
However, given the diversity of the contexts, design of studies and the quality of underlying 
data, one does not know how to generalize and interpret the findings. 
In the contentious area of microcredit, there are few agreements—one being the role 
microcredit in smoothing income and consumption. In rural areas, poor households face 
many types of economic contingencies including adverse health shocks and weather 
shocks.  Here, microcredit can not only help to smooth seasonal consumption, but also 
avert distress sales of livestock and other assets, thereby smoothing longer-term income. 
This is no trivial help for a poor family, for whom a sudden dip in income can lead to a 
downward spiral into destitution. Various criticisms notwithstanding, microcredit certainly 
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plays a valuable function in the lives of poor people, a fact that is reflected in the briskly 
increasing demand for microcredit over the years over the world. 
Income Transfers, Social SafetyNet and Workfare 
Some people are permanently poor, and they require continuous income transfers to stay 
above water.  In developing countries, these income transfers often can take the form of 
public food distribution programs. Unless these programs are well targeted toward the 
poor, they can, sooner or later, turn into a fiscal burden for the government. A variant of 
cash-transfer programs, which has gained a good deal of popularity since the 1990s, is the 
conditional cash-transfer programs.   These transfers are contingent on recipients’ actions 
with respect to schooling, nutrition, vaccinations etc. They seek to break the cycle of inter-
generational poverty through human capital development.   
Social safety nets are similar to income transfers but are provided only to the poor 
whose poverty is transitory. Workfare programs are a particular type of income transfer 
system where the poor are required to work as a condition of receiving the welfare 
payment. A sub-class of workfare system is Employment Guarantee Schemes (EGSs) in 
South Asia, intended to guarantee employment to anyone who wants to work at a pre-
determined (typically lower) wage rate. In Bangladesh, such social insurance programs 
include the Food-for-work and the rural maintenance program, wherein wages are paid in 
kind (food) at a below market rate. Deployed during slack seasons, this type of program is 
used to create and maintain rural physical infrastructure such as roads, river embankments, 
and irrigation channels. Though largely short-term palliative, such welfare programs have 
played an important role in creating employment and containing hunger in slack seasons in 
South Asia. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The pandemic has upended the progress the developing world achieved in poverty 
reduction in the last thirty years or so. Many millions have slipped into the abyss of poverty 
and the ranks of the poor are still swelling. The big question now is once the pandemic is 
over--or it is brought under control--can the developing world rekindle the process of 
poverty reduction to rescue the millions that are now trapped in poverty?  
There are reasons to believe that the process is likely to be slow. The dual engine of 
poverty reduction—both growth and distributive measures (the latter often being linked to 
robust growth — is likely to operate much slowly.  A number of factors seem to be at play. 
First, in recent years, the international trading environment has become increasingly more 
protectionist. Rather than promoting open multilateral trading arrangements under WTO, 
rich and powerful countries are increasingly pursuing regional trading arrangements, 
developments that have fragmented the global trading system. An unfortunate 
consequence of this is that in recent years, the rate of growth of exports from developing 
countries had been on the decline, causing a slowdown in the rates of growth of income 
and employment.  
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Second, since the 1990s, world trade has been increasingly characterized by global value 
chains (GVC) and a large of the global trade is comprised of intermediate goods—parts and 
components. This process has, however, experienced a slowdown in very recent year due to 
such technological advances as robotics and automation, which  helped to draw production 
closer to the consumer; the net result is however is a reduction in the demand for labor at 
home and abroad. Also germane is the fact that   the current brewing trade conflicts among 
large countries, such as the US and China, can lead to a further retrenchment or a 
segmentation of GVCs. The process has received a further jolt with the arrival of the 
pandemic, which hit home the relative merit of just-in-time strategy (associated with GVC) 
versus just-in-place strategy. The US and Europe are actively pursuing a policy of onshoring 
of supply chains, particularly of vital goods and supplies —such as food, medicine etc.-- 
from abroad.     
Third, over the years, many labor-surplus economies in Asia and Africa benefitted 
enormously from labor exports to the oil-producing Middle Eastern countries.  This has 
provided these countries a safety valve to reduce the rising pressure of unemployment and 
to help generate sizable remittance income. However, the situation has been changing fast 
in recent years. The demand for expatriate labor in the Middle Eastern countries has been 
shrinking rapidly because of the precipitous decline in oil prices—which may not recover in 
the near future (Economist, 2020)—and the Arabization policy (to substitute foreign labor 
with domestic labor). 
Finally, some countries such as the United States are now pursuing an active policy to 
bring back investment form foreign lands to the homeland, a policy which has been 
facilitated by the growing capabilities of automation.  If successful, this would thwart one of 
the most reliable strategies of poor countries to attract outside investment by offering low 
wages to compensate for low productivity and skill levels.  
In short, the above suggests that in the post-pandemic era, the tempo of poverty 
reduction will  become  slower as past successful strategies of development—particularly, 
the model of outward-oriented growth—become less effective, and as the  feasibility of 
successful distributive policies become more circumscribed with falling growth. 
 
NOTES 
1. Two more poverty lines, which reflect the costs of a higher bundle of basic needs in more 
developed countries, are also used internationally: US$3.20 and US$5.50 per person per day. 
The World Bank now refers to the poverty associated with the lowest poverty line ($1.90 per 
person per day) as extreme poverty (World Bank, 2018). 
2. Although the term inclusive growth has been in use since at least 2000    (ADB, 2000), 
there is yet to emerge an agreed-upon   definition of the concept.  There are at least two 
different usages in the literature —first, an absolute, more expansive concept that   refers to  
any pattern of growth that is accompanied by poverty reduction, irrespective of how much 
of the growth accrues to the poor and how much to the rich ; second , a relative, more 
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restrictive  concept that refers to a pattern of growth when the incomes of the poor grow 
faster than the incomes of the rich. 
3. According to Dani Rodrik, “Historically nothing has worked better than economic growth 
in enabling societies to improve the life chances of their members, including those at the 
very bottom. If you look at a map of the world today and ask where there is the greatest 
incidence of poverty, the simplest answer is: where there has been the least amount of 
growth since the onset of modern economic growth around the middle of the eighteenth 
century.” (Rodrik, 2007) 
4. An exception would be technologies that limit employment by substituting capital by 
labor. The new technologies that promote automation and robotics would fall under this 
category. 
5. A common measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which spans between 
(0,1). It is 0 when there is perfect equality in the society—i.e., everyone receives the identical 
level of income in a society; It is 100 when there is perfect inequality in the society—i.e., all 
incomes go to one person.  
6. The approach to foreign investments did vary among these countries. While Hong Kong, 
China; Malaysia; and Singapore, and later in Indonesia and Thailand embraced FDI with 
open arms, Korea and Taiwan were not as enthusiastic; however, the latter countries 
encouraged the acquisition of foreign technology through licenses and other means.  
7. The strategy of economic openness may fail unless complemented by other policies, such 
as macroeconomic stability, investments in physical and social infrastructure, labor market 
flexibility, and good economic governance. For East Asian Miracle economies, these 
complementary policies helped to create a domestic economic environment that 
encouraged productive investment and production rather than diversion into socially 
unproductive activities, such as rent seeking, corruption, and theft, Finally,  contrary to a 
widely held belief, industrial policy was certainly not a common feature of all the miracle 
economies. The countries that practiced industrial policy succeeded in some sectors but not 
in others. The overall impact of industrial policy on growth remains conclusively 
inconclusive (Quibria, 2002) 
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